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TRIAL TRANSCRIPT PAGES CITED IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
1 A The divcrce w.^ f:]^i -ily V: , 1^--
2 Q Do you have any children? 
3 A Y e s , I «li > I ih.1! /(•:• ! h r e e . 
4 Q Who , ; ! ' * * • r - • : ' ^ v. • : H K -
5 j Sept ember df(i 
fi ;
 k James did. 
.; And who has custody now? 
I 
What kind of visitation rights di d you have i n 
; September of 1987 with t .he children? 
> * It was reasonable vi sitation. 
Those were the words that are used in > our di vor ce? 
Rig1 
Thank you. Had you p r i o r t o t h e 6 th of September 
+ ~> -* *- * -tines Sandova l , your e x - h u s b a n d , abou t 
I d r e i I ? • ' . . . 
Yes, 
1' Where wei - lames anil t h e c h i l d r e n l i v i n g ? 
1 '- I I I i I , l , i I n 
2
" Did discuss visitation for around the 6th of 
2 September? 
2 Yes, I I I 
23 Q What was Line d i s c u s s i o n t h a t you had w i t h your ' 
2 4 e K - l'Msl 1'!" 1 I 11 ' I I' ' " i ( "•! I " 'I * 
25 A I called him at his job in Pocatello and asked hi m 
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Q Was his face towards you or was it his back towards 
you through the screen door, or could you --
A 
Q 
A 
if they 
and we , 
Q 
His face. 
What happened then as he went back in the house? 
Then I talked to the children and I asked them 
wanted to go for a ride with me, and they said "Yes," 
got into the car and went for a ride. 
Did James Sandoval say anything to you as you 
drove away with the children? 
A 
Q 
No, he did not. 
Where did you take the children when you drove 
away with them? 
A 
Provo. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
time? 
A 
Q 
Oakmont 
A 
younger 
I took them directly up to my mother's house in 
And where is that house? 
It's up in Oak Hills, Oakmont Lane. 
Is that in Utah County? 
Yes, it is. 
Did James Sandoval follow you up there at that 
No, he did not. 
What did you do after you took the children up to 
Lane? 
I took the children up there, and my mother and my 
brother was there. And the children were filthy, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
driveway. 
Right. 
Then what happened? 
And they just came running from the truck up the 
And I ran back into the front door trying to get 
the children into the front door of the house. 
Q 
A 
they 
sive. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
into 
Q 
1
 A 
your 
Q 
were 
the 
And why did you do that? 
Because, well, because I was scared, you know, 
screaming and, you know, they, they looked aggres-
Could you tell what they were shouting? 
No, I could not. 
What happened as you ran up to the front door then? 
I went up to the front door, and the kids went 
front door, and I locked it. 
Where was your mother at this time? 
She was still out by the car. 
MS. BARLOW: May I approach the witness, 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
(By Ms. Barlow) I'll show you what's been marked 
State's Exhibit 1 for identification. Do you recognize what 
that 
A 
Q 
to? 
is a photograph of? 
Yes. That's a photograph of my mother's house. 
And is this the house that you have been testifying 
1 A He is three. 
2 Q And then what happened? 
3 A Robert grabbed my son out of my arm while, and I 
4 was trying to hold him, I was holding onto Robert, and he 
5 was trying to get out of the front door. And I kept pushing 
6 it shut, my back was to it. Finally, he got my son away 
7 from me and ran down the stairs out through the basement. 
8 Q And then what happened? 
9 A I went up to try and use the phone again. 
10 Q Were you able to get through to the police? 
11 A Yes, this time I was. 
12 Q What did you tell them? 
13 A I just told them the address and that we, you 
14 know, that there were three people there. And they wanted 
15 their names. I can't remember my exact words. I was in a 
16 panic. And I probably sounded really foolish anyway, but I 
17 was trying to get some info to her. But I was trying, before 
18 they come in the house, all I could hear was my mother 
19 screaming downstairs, MGet out of my house, get out of my 
20 house." 
21 Q Did you hang up then after talking to the police? 
22 A No. I'm trying trying to remember. I tried to get 
23 through one time and I couldn't get through, I couldn't get 
24 the buttons pushed right. And when I did finally get through 
25 to them, I did stay on the phone. 
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BY MR. PETRO: 
Q Mrs. Sandoval, you indicated that James had 
custody of his three children. Is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q At the time this matter happened. And immediately 
prior to taking the children, you had not talked with Jim 
on the phone about taking them; did you? 
A No. 
Q And at the time you visited James at his residence 
or claimed you visited with him at the residence, you didn't 
indicate to him you were taking the children at that time 
either, did you? 
A No. 
Q You just merely took the children. Is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And from there you took the children to, 
directly to your mother's house. Is that right? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. Now, you indicated that when Jim and the 
other two defendants showed up at your mother's house you 
were concerned about your safety. Is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q If you were concerned about your safety, why hadn't 
you contacted the police prior to taking the children and 
advising them that there might be some kind of dispute? 
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A 
Q 
and 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I really don't know. 
You just merely took it upon yourself to go ahead 
seized the kids? 
to him 
Q 
A 
Q 
he was 
A 
Q 
the 
That's not the word I would use, no. 
But you took them. Is that correct? 
I exercised my visitation rights. 
Without any kind of notification? 
I was instructed I have permission when I talked 
in Idaho. 
And you talked to him when he was in Idaho. 
Right. 
Is that correct? You never talked to him while 
in Utah? 
No. I wasn't allowed to. 
Okay. Now, you indicated that Robert, and he's 
fellow seated on the left, entered through the front 
door of 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
landing 
the residence. Is that correct? 
No, I do not. 
Okay, where did Robert enter? 
Entered down at the basement door. 
Robert came into the basement? 
Um-hum. (yes) 
Okay. What did Robert do upon entry into the houses 
He went into the house and up the stairs to the 
where I was at. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
standing directly behind it, you were pushed against this 
wall. I; 
A 
Q 
hit 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
you ( 
happened 
what 
A 
And 
ing 
: you 
when 
3 that right? 
Yes. 
Okay. How, when Robert entered did he attempt to 
Dr do anything to you? 
No, he did not. 
So he just ran upstairs. Is that correct? 
Yes. 
Now, where were the three children, do you know? 
They were upstairs. 
And who else was upstairs? 
My sister. 
Now, Robert ran upstairs, and you don't know what 
when he was up there with your sister other than 
have been told. Is that right? 
I, when I ran up after, I did see them scuffling. 
I dialed the phone I saw him, I guess he was search-
for his glasses. They had been knocked off. And, I 
really did not see what was going on. 
Q 
you 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. So how long after Robert went upstairs did 
go upstairs? 
Just right behind him. 
Immediately after him. 
Yes. 
Okay. And where were the three children when you 
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A I didn't, know. 
Q Were you dispatched on a report that came from 
Mr. Sandoval? 
A I was dispatched on three calls on the same day, 
generated from him. 
Q What was the first call you were dispatched on? 
A It was approximately 11:15. It was an attempt to 
locate call. I wasn't dispatched anywhere. A female in a 
red Honda had abducted three children. 
Q That's what you were told? 
A that's what I was told. But the caller didn't 
give any information as to where or where they were going. 
So it was just a general attempt to locate. 
Q Did they give you information about who the persons 
were in the car? 
A Mrs. Pamela Sandoval was the person in the car 
who had taken her children from her ex-husband. 
Q So you had been given that much information? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you locate that red Honda? 
A No. We didn't even know where to start to look, 
because the information was never given to us as to where the 
abuduction took place or where the individual was going. 
Q What was the second call? 
A I was dispatched a little over an hour later to 
1 I 400 South and 604 East, on a keep-the-peace. Mr. Sandoval 
2 had located his children and requested police assistance in 
3 getting his children. 
4 Q Did you go to that location? 
5 A I did. 
6 Q What did you find? 
7 A There was nobody at the residence. There was no-
8 body around to meet me. The place was deserted. 
9 Q What did you do then when you found no one there? 
10 A As I was at the front door, dispatch put out an 
11 officers requested to clear, aggravated assault in progress, 
12 that three male Mexicans had entered a home, had forcibly 
13 taken the children and they were using a shotgun. 
14 Q Did you respond to that call? 
15 A I did. It was a Code 3 response to the residence. 
16 Q Was that Mrs. Preecefs residence in Oakmont Lane? 
17 A It was. 
18 Q What did you find when you arrived there? 
19 A While enroute, dispatch had also put out that some 
20 three suspects had left in a gold and white Chevrolet pickup 
21 truck. And Officers Halvorsen and Mason made a stop on that 
22 pickup truck, and I continued alone to that residence. When 
23 I arrived, Mrs. Preece was standing in the doorway, hanging 
24 onto the door jamb for balance. 
25 Q When you say "the doorway," was that the double-
1 out where Pam lives.11 And when we got up to Pam's house, 
2 we had parked across the street. And we had seen the car 
3 backed up in there, and we saw Pam and her mother loading the 
4 car up. So I told Jimmy that maybe we better go over to the 
5 telephone. And he told me he had already called the officers, 
6 And I said maybe we better go do this again, call the police 
7 and tell them what's happening. 
8 Q And, did he go to the telephone? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Now, did Pam and her mother see you as you sat 
11 watching them? 
12 A I don't think they could see us from where we were 
13 at, but they drove right by us and they looked right at us. 
14 Q Why didn't, when you first arrived there, why 
15 didn't you just merely go up to her residence and stop her 
16 there? 
17 A Because I thought it would be wiser if we waited 
18 until an officer come. 
19 Q All right. And then after they drove away what 
20 happened? 
21 A Well, they drove right by us. And then I told 
22 Jimmy, I says "Well, what should we do?" I said "She might 
23 cut out with the kids and leave the state, you know how she 
24 is." And so what we did was we followed, we didn't follow 
25 them really, they went one way and we went the other way; and 
1 then we stopped at my ex-wife's house who lives kind of in 
2 the same neighborhood as Pam. 
3 Q You got some information from her? 
4 A And I asked, and I went and knocked on her door 
5 and I asked her --
6 Q Okay. Don't talk about what you asked her. But 
7 you did get some information from her. Okay. And then where 
8 did you go from there? 
9 A And then we drove up to Pamfs mother's house. 
10 Q And that's the residence that's located on Oakmont 
11 Lane? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Now, after you arrived what did you see? 
14 A When we pulled up, Pam and Shenay and Shane --
15 Q Okay. Who are Shenay and Shane? 
16 A Jimmy's and Pam's children. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A Were coming out the front door, walking down the 
19 steps. The mother was standing by the door. Car --
20 Q That's Mrs. Preece? 
21 A Mrs. Preece. Car doors were open. She was coming, 
22 the mother was standing there and Jesse was coming out and herj 
23 son standing there, too, if I remember right, by the door. 
24 Q By the basement door? 
25 A By the basement door. And they were coming out. 
1 had ahold of the little boy, Jesse. And the grandmother had 
2 the little boy by the neck. So she was tugging and I didn't 
3 tug, I just followed her in. We went right through the 
4 basement door into the house. 
5 Q With the little boy? 
6 A With the little boy between us. 
7 Q All right. And then what happened? 
8 A Then I got the little boy away from the grandmother,| 
9 And then I did, I mean, I couldn't go out the front door 
10 because he had --
11 Q Who is "he"? 
12 A Her son, 
13 Q Uh-huh. 
14 A Was blocking the way. So I just grabbed the little 
15 boy and went running through the house, and then I went run-
16 ning up to the front door up, while he run up the stairs, 
17 tried to go out the front door; and Pam jumped off the top 
18 banister and jumped me, grabbed ahold me, ar\d was screaming 
19 and stuff and trying to scratch my eyes out, knock my glasses 
20 off, was hitting on me. 
21 Q Okay. And then what happened with Jesse, the little) 
22 boy? 
23 A Oh, he was still in my arms, at the time. 
24 Q And then what happened? 
25 A I was trying to go out the front door, and Pam was 
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faster than that? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
They didn't respond. 
By the time the officer got there, you had left? 
They had already left. 
And you went to your ex-wife's house? 
Yes. 
What made you think that perhaps they had gone to 
Oakmont Lane? 
A Well, what makes me think to Oakmont Lane? Because 
the grandmother was in the car when they drove by. Where 
else wou! 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
children 
Q 
might 
South 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
South 
be 
Ld they be going? 
But you didn't go straight up to Oakmont Lane, --
No. 
-- you went to your ex-wife's house? 
I went to my ex-wife's to see if Pam had left the 
there. 
Did you call the police and say "we think they 
at Oakmont Lane" instead of this other address in 
Provo? 
I didn't call the police, Jimmy did. 
Did any of you call the police? 
Jimmy. 
After you left the address at, what is it, 6th 
and 4th East, excuse me, 6th East and 4th South, after 
you left that address, you went to your ex-wife's house; 
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did you 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
on your 
A 
up the i 
Q 
A 
phone. 
Q 
go then? 
I went back up the stairs. 
Did you go all the way up or just to the level? 
Just to the level. 
And you were looking for your glasses there? 
Um-hum. 
And then where did you go? 
Then I went back down the stairs. 
Where was Mrs. Preece while you were doing this? 
She was just standing there screaming. 
Where were you when she jumped in the air to land 
glasses? 
I was down on the bottom. I was, just as she went 
steps. 
She, what, went past you, and back and up the steps? 
She was going up the steps where Pam was on the 
When you say she jumped in the air and landed on 
your glasses, how did she do that? 
A 
Q 
knees? 
A 
Q 
A 
Just somebody jumping up and jump on something. 
Did she jump and land with her feet or with her 
Yes, both feet. 
Did you see her land on her knees? 
I seen her when she jumped and she landed and she 
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A Yes. I never denied her child visitations. 
Q Okay. And did she indicate she wanted visitation 
when she got, when you got into town? 
A Well, when she called me and she asked me about 
that, she was pretty radical. She was threatening me left 
and right about taking the kids and just, and I got paranoid. 
I told her, "If I come down, we'll sit down and talk about 
it." 
Q All right. And then when you got into town, into 
Provo, did you ever hear from her before this incident took 
place? 
A No. 
Q Now, the children were taken, and I guess there's 
no question it's by Pam that they were taken. 
A Um-hum. (affirmative) 
Q Where were they when they were taken? 
A Out, well, in the front of the house. 
Q And did you initially know who took the children? 
A No, not at, because I was inside the house. 
Q Okay. Did you have a suspicion who took them? 
A When I, while I was making them lunch, I was making 
them lunch and washing them clothes at the same time. And 
when I glanced out there, the only thing I seen was this 
little red car pulling away. And I came out, and I ran out 
to the road and looked down, and here this car is just taking 
1 off. And I didn't know what, you know, there's been so many 
2 kidnaps, you know, in this country. So I thought, well, 
3 I'll call the cops, I'll call the police officers. 
4 Q Okay. Did you have, after, before that happened, 
5 did you have any conversation with Pam in the front yard? 
6 A No. We didn't even talk. 
7 Q And you called and you talked to the police. Is 
8 that correct? 
9 A Officer Peterson. 
10 Q And you indicated the children had been taken? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q All right. What happened from that point on? 
13 A Well, he was telling me --
14 Q Okay, don't talk about what he was telling you. 
15 What happened from that point on? 
16 A Well, I sat down. I didn't, I didn't know what 
17 really to do. I didn't. So I thought, well, I'll call my 
18 brother. So I called my brother Bob to come up and to help 
19 me. 
20 Q And did he arrive? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q At your place? 
23 I A He came. 
24 Q All right. Did Patrick Dominquez ever come to 
25 your residence? 
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Q 
that 
A 
Q 
want 
-- and you didn't bother to call and tell them 
wasn't where they were anymore? 
No. 
Why, when you got up there and saw that Pam didn't 
to talk to you and that Mrs. Preece, as you say, was 
being hysterical, why didn't you just leave it and call the 
police? 
A Because Pam was always threatening me that she was 
going to take the children. I became --
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
didn' 
they 
that 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
She works here in Utah, doesn't she? 
I don't know. 
She lives here? 
She, she, she comes and goes, yes. 
Well, has she ever lived elsewhere? 
Yes. 
With you? 
No. 
Isn't it true that Detective Maak said "Well, why 
t you just park your truck in front of their car so 
couldn't leave, and go call the police"? He mentioned 
to you, didn't he? 
Um-hum. (yes) 
And you said "Yes, I could have done that"? 
Um-hum. (yes) 
But you didn't do that? 
1 occurred, in that these individuals forced their way in and 
2 began immediately to commit assaults upon these individuals. 
3 Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right, thank you, counsel, 
5 Where are the other exhibits? We have some photographs that, 
6 would you get those for me? 
7 I'll take time and look at this, counsel. I would 
8 think that within a half-an-hour I'll be able to give you a 
9 decision. So at this time we'll be in recess or out that 
10 long. When I have gone over it, I'll call you back and 
11 we'll let you know. 
12 (WHEREUPON, the Court recessed at 2:17 o'clock 
13 p.m. and reconvened at 3:02 o'clock p.m., as follows: 
14 THE COURT: We'll continue with Case 
15 No. CR-87-497, the State of Utah, Plaintiff, vs. James 
16 Sandoval, and Robert L. Sandoval, and Patrick Dominquez. 
17 The record should show that the state is present, represented 
18 by counsel, that the defendants are present represented by 
19 their counsel. 
20 The Court has reviewed the evidence in this matter 
21 and has reviewed the law as I see it applicable to this case. 
22 J In this matter the defendants are each charged with 
two Counts, one being burglary, a second degree felony, in 23 
24 violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
25 amended, in that they, on or about September 6, 1987, in 
1 Utah County, Utah, did unlawfully enter or remain in the 
2 dwelling of LeAnn Preece, with the intent to commit assault 
3 upon LeAnn Preece, David Preece, and Pamela Sandoval. Count 
4 II, assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of 76-5-102, 
5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that they, on or 
6 about September 6, 1987, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly 
7 and intentionally assault LeAnn Preece, David Preece, and 
8 Pamela Sandoval, by attempting to do bodily injury to LeAnn 
9 Preece, David Preece, and Pamela Sandoval, with unlawful 
10 force or violence, 
11 The elements of the charge of burglary in this 
12 matter appear to the Court to be these: 
13 1. That on or about the 6th of September, 1987, 
14 at Utah County, Utah, the defendants did unlawfully enter or 
15 remain in the dwelling of LeAnn Preece, 3, with the intent 
16 to commit an assault upon LeAnn Preece, David Preece, and 
17 Pamela Sandoval, or that they did so knowingly and intention-
18 ally. 
19 Burglary is defined in the statute, to which refer-
20 ence is made in the Information, is this: 
21 "A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
22 remains unlawfully in a building or a portion of a building 
23 with an intent to commit an assault on any person. Burglary 
24 is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in 
25 a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second 
1 degree.n 
2 An assault, by statute, 76-5-102, is defined as: 
3 "An attempt with unlawful force or violence to do bodily 
4 injury to another, or (b) a threat accompanied by a show of 
5 immediate force or violence to do bodily injury to another." 
6 MAn attempt under the law is described and defined 
7 as for the purposes of that part is a person is guilty of 
8 an attempt to commit a crime if acting with the kind of 
9 J culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
11 I step toward the commission of the offense." 
12 The term "bodily injury" is defined in the statute 
13 as being "bodily injury means physical pain, illness or any 
14 J impairment of physical conditions." And, "a statute deter-
mines and rules that a person enters or remains unlawfully in 
or upon premises when the premises or any portion thereof 
at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the 
public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
10 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 I thereof." 
21 I There's another statute that applies, it seems to 
22 | the Court, in this circumstance; and that is Section 76-2-202\ 
23 I "Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or 
24 for conduct of another. Every person acting with the mental 
25 I state required for the commission of an offense, who directly 
1 commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
2 encourages or intentionally aids another person to engage 
3 in conduct which constitutes an offense, shall be criminally 
4 liable as a party for such conduct." 
5 The statute further defines the words "intentional-
6 ly, or with intent, or wilfully, or knowingly, or with 
7 knowledge, as follows:11 This is Section 76-2-103. "Inten-
8 tionally or with intent or wilfully with regard to the nature 
9 of his conduct, a person engages in conduct, intentionally 
10 or with intent or wilfully with respect to the nature of his 
11 conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his con-
12 scious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
13 the result." 2. "Knowingly or with knowledge, with respect 
14 to his conduct or his circumstances surrounding his conduct 
15 when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
16 circumstances, a person acts knowingly or with knowledge with 
17 respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
18 J conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." 
"A person engages in conduct with criminal negli-19 
20 J gence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances) 
21 I surrounding his conduct as a result of his conduct when he 
22 I ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
23 I that circumstances exist or the results will occur." 
Now, how does all of that apply to the case that we 24 
25 have before us today? 
1 It appears to the Court that it has been establish-
2 ed beyond any reasonable doubt: that the incident in this 
3 case occurred on the 6th of September 1987; that it did occur 
4 in Utah County; that the defendants did unlawfully enter or 
5 remain in the dwelling of Mrs. Preece. 
6 There is nothing in the record in any way to suggest] 
7 that they had any right to be in that buidling, in that 
8 dwelling, under the circumstances? even though they may have 
9 been interested in retrieving these children. And I think 
10 that's what their intent was, is to retrieve the children. 
11 They had no legal right, no business going upon the premises 
12 of Mrs. Preece under the circumstances and without her 
13 permission. 
14 It's obvious, it's on the record, even taking the 
15 evidence the most favorable to the position of the defen-
16 dants in any respect, that they did force their way into 
17 that building, into that dwelling, over the objection of 
18 Mrs. Preece and of Mrs. Sandoval and of David Preece. 
19 The question then resolves down to whether or not 
20 they had an intent to commit an assault as they entered upon 
21 that undertaking. 
22 I think the facts are established beyond a reason-
23 able doubt, that these men were intent upon regaining posses-
24 sion, irrespective of what it took and without any assistance, 
25 that they were going to do it by self-help. 
1 The evidence appears to be clear and unrefuted 
2 that Pamela did call James after she got up to her mother's 
3 and told him that she had the children, they were there for 
4 visitation, and that James said MI fm coming to get you11; that 
5 Pamela felt threatened by that circumstance. 
6 The evidence is certainly clear that Robert went 
7 in the basement door of that dwelling, and in a contest with 
8 Mrs. Preece over the physical possession of the one minor 
9 child, the testimony of Mrs. Sandoval is that after they 
10 got into the building that she scuffled with Robert in an 
11 attempt to get her son away from Robert, the brother of the 
12 father of the child; that Robert hit her, on the head, that 
13 he stomped on her foot. 
14 The evidence is unrefuted and agreed upon that 
15 Robert and Mrs. Preece engaged in a scuffle over the posses-
16 sion of the child, and that that scuffle ensued from the 
17 outside into the building, and that Robert pursued the child 
18 and Mrs. Preece into the building. And the Court finds that 
19 there is no doubt, any reasonable doubt, about the fact that 
20 Mrs. Preece was pushed and shoved and that she did sustain 
21 injury. 
22 There is no dispute from anyone*s part that there 
23 was a considerable amount of scuffling and running about in 
24 that place, there was a lot of anger exhibited. And the 
25 evidence, irrespective of whether or not the poker was 
1 actually used by James, the evidence is clear that he was 
2 in a position standing over Mrs. Preece with the poker in 
3 a spear-position and only relinquished that position when 
4 David came upon the scene with the gun in his hand and 
5 ordered them out or that he would shoot. 
6 It appears to the Court, of course intent is a 
7 subjective thing, no one can look into one's mind and tell 
8 what is there. The only way we can arrive at that is by the 
9 actions that one undertakes. And it appears clear to the 
10 Court that there can be no doubt, no reasonable doubt, that 
11 these men had the intent to enter that building, that they 
12 had the intent to take whatever steps were necessary, to 
13 inflict whatever injury was necessary to gain possession of 
14 those children. They had the physical force, they had the 
15 ability, they had a show of force. There were three men 
16 against two women and a child. There isn't any question that 
17 these men, in the view of the Court, were acting intentional-
18 ly, that they were acting knowingly, the consequences of what 
19 they were doing; and that evidence of their intent to commit 
20 assault is further substantiated by the fact that they did in 
21 fact perpetrate and inflict injury upon Mrs. Preece and upon 
22 Mrs. Sandoval. 
23 So that the case that the Court has found and the 
24 Court believes that the perpetration of a battery necessarily 
25 J implies intent. While "intent" may not —"attempt" may not 
imply a battery or a completion of the act, the completion 
of the act certainly includes the attempt that the statute 
prohibits. 
So the Court, consequently, finds beyond a reason-
able doubt that these men, and each of them, did have the 
intent when they entered that building to perpetrate an 
assault upon the occupants thereof. 
The Court believes that they are each responsible, 
under the circumstances, for the actions of the others, since 
it was a concerted effort on their part, they were aiding 
and abetting each other when they went into that building, 
and that, therefore, under the statute they are all three 
charged as principals. 
So the Court, consequently, finds each of you men 
guilty of the charge contained in Count I of the Information. 
With respect to Count II, that being the assault 
charge, it appears to the Court that since that is neces-
sarily an included offense with the Count I of burglary, 
the Court could not find them guilty of Count I without 
finding then that they are guilty of Count II, that being 
assault. I don't believe that the law would permit them to be 
punished or charge of convicted of that Count II. 
The Court refers in that respect to the case of 
State of Utah vs. Bradley, 19 Utah Advance Report 4, which 
makes reference to a case of State vs. Hill, 674 Pacific 2d 
is? 
20 
21 
1 I 96, and State vs. Baker, 671 Pacific 2d 152, when it indicates) 
2 that those charges then as a matter of law stand in the 
3 relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defen-
4 dant cannot be convicted or punished for both. 
5 So the Court finds in this circumstance and believes! 
6 that the finding of guilt on the first Count necessarily 
7 includes a violation of at least Count II and, therefore, 
8 that they cannot be punished for both Counts and that Count 
9 II should, therefore, for that reason be dismissed, 
10 Gentlemen, the law provides that you cannot be 
11 sentenced sooner than two nor more than 30 days from today, 
12 It does permit you to have your case reviewed by Adult 
13 Probation & Parole for the purpose of that Department con-
14 ducting an investigation and report to assist the Court in 
15 determining what penalty should be imposed in this case. 
16 You, of course, after sentence is imposed, whatever 
17 that will be, have a right to appeal this decision of the 
18 Court. You may do that within 30 days. And your counsel 
19 J will advise you concerning that. 
The Court will remain you again after the sentence 
has been imposed in this matter of your right to appeal the 
22 decision of the Court to the Utah Supreme Court. 
23 Do you have a request in that regard, Mr. Petro? 
24 MR. PETRO: We would like to have it 
25 I referred. 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter is an appeal of the conviction of 
defendants of a second degree felony burglary. Jurisdiction over 
appeals from the district court of a second degree felony 
conviction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence introduced at 
trial to support the judge's finding, as trier of fact, that 
defendants had the requisite intent to support a conviction for 
burglary. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, the State relies on the 
following statutory provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1978) (amended 1983): 
Culpable mental state required—Strict 
liability—Every offense not involving strict 
liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility. 
An offense shall involve strict liability 
only when a statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to 
impose strict liability for the conduct by 
use of the phrase "strict liability" or other 
terms of similar import. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978)5 
Burglary—(1) A person is guilty of burglary 
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit 
an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwellingf 
in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1988): 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory 
juryf the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with Burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-202 (1978) and 
Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
$ 76-5-102 (1978). Defendants were tried on April 7, 1988, in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, by the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen, sitting without a jury. The Court convicted 
defendants of the Burglary charge and dismissed the Assault 
charge as a lesser-included offense under State v. Bradley, 78 
Utah Adv. Rep. 2 (filed March 15, 1988). 
On May 20, 1988, defendants were sentenced separately 
to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and a 
fine of $750.00 plus $187.50 to the Victim Reparation Fund and to 
make restitution in the amount of $944.21. Execution of their 
sentences was suspended and the defendants placed on probation 
with certain conditions. 
Notice of Appeal was filed for the defendants on June 
20, 1988 and a Certificate of Probable Cause for defendants was 
signed on June 29, 1988, by Judge Christensen. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to September 6, 1987, defendant James Sandoval 
was divorced from Pamela Sandoval and he retained custody of 
their three children (R. 86). Defendant James Sandoval was 
living with the children in Pocatello, Idaho, and Pamela had 
reasonable visitation right under their divorce decree (R. 86). 
Prior to September 6, Pamela telephoned defendant James at his 
work in Idaho and asked if he was travelling to Provo for the 
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Labor Day weekend which included September 6 (R. 86-87). He told 
Pamela that if he came down, she could see the children (R. 87). 
She found that he had travelled to Provo that weekend when she 
saw his vehicle at his parents' house (R. 87). She tried to 
telephone him several times but was unable to speak with him (R. 
87-88). 
On Sunday, September 6, 1987, Pamela went to the 
Sandoval home to exercise her visitation rights (R. 87). Her 
children were outside the house when she arrived and she went to 
them (R. 88). She saw defendant James at the house and spoke 
briefly to him then he went into the house and eventually stood 
at the door watching Pamela and the children (R. 88). Pamela 
asked the children if they wanted to go for a ride with her and 
they got into the car (R. 89). Defendant James said nothing to 
them as they left (R. 89). Pamela took the children to her 
mother's house in Provo and left them with her younger brother, 
David Preece, while she and her mother, Le Ann Preece, went to 
Pamela's house for clean clothing for the children (R. 89-90). 
While at her mother's house, before leaving to get the 
clothing, Pamela received a phone call from the girlfriend who 
had driven the car when she picked up the children (R. 102-03). 
From that call, Pamela became aware that her ex-husband, 
defendant James, was angry so she telephone him (R. 103). She 
told him that she was visiting with the children and that they 
were fine (R. 104). He then threatened her, saying "Well, I'm 
going to get you. . . . I'm coming to get you, Pam, and you'd 
better watch your ass, I'm coming to get you." (R. 104.) He 
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repeated that several times and Pamela felt threatened by him (R. 
104). 
Pamela retrieved a small trunk from her house which 
contained the children's clothes and toys (R. 90). When Pamela 
and her mother returned to the mother's house, the children ran 
out of the house toward the car (R. 90). As they did so, the 
three defendants pulled up in a pickup, got out and started 
running toward the house, yelling (R. 90-91 and 108). Pamela was 
frightened and tried to get the children into the house (R. 91). 
The house is a split level with a front door half-way 
between the levels which opens to an entry way and stairs leading 
up or down (Photos, State's Exhibit 1, 6, 7, and 8; R. 91-92). 
Also at the front of the house is a newly built gray door next to 
the garage and leading into a room on the lower level (Photo, 
State's Exhibit 1 and R. 92 and 110). When Pamela ran toward the 
house with the children she went into the front door and locked 
it (R 91). Her mother was still outside the home, by the 
automobile in the driveway (R. 91). 
Inside the house Pamela went up the stairs to the 
telephone to call the police and heard a commotion downstairs 
then saw defendant Robert Sandoval run up the stairs (R. 92). 
She was holding her three-year-old son in her arms but defendant 
Robert grabbed him away from her and tried to go out the front 
door (R. 92-93). In the course of struggling over the child, 
defendant Robert struck Pamela on the head and "stomped" on her 
foot (R. 99). Pamela and Robert continued to struggle over the 
child, then defendant Robert got the child away and ran 
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downstairs to the basement (R. 93). Pamela went back upstairs to 
the phone and was able to get through to the police (R. 93). She 
could hear her mother downstairs shouting to the defendants to 
get out of the house (R. 93). 
Pamela was still on the phone when she turned and saw 
her mother coming up the stairs with defendants James and Robert 
behind her (R. 94). Pamela saw defendant James push her mother 
head long into the front door and then lift a fireplace poker as 
if to stab Mrs. Preece with it (R. 94). At that point, Pamela's 
15-year-old brother, David, pointed an empty gun at defendants 
and told them to leave (R. 94). Defendants dropped the fireplace 
tools and left the house going back down the stairs and through 
the basement door (R. 95). 
Mrs. Preece testified that, when defendants first 
arrived at her house, they ran toward the house, screaming (R. 
108-09). She had never met defendant Patrick Dominguez before 
but knew defendants James and Robert Sandoval (R. 105) and had 
previously told the Sandovals to stay away from her property (R. 
117-18 and 129-30). 
When the defendants ran toward the house as Pamela 
pushed the children in the front door and locked it, David, her 
brother, closed and locked the gray basement door (R. 109). Mrs. 
Preece was startled by the arrival of defendants and still stood 
in the driveway, by the car she had just gotten out of (R. 108-09 
and 119). She saw defendant Robert try to get in the front door 
then he evidently ran to the other door (R. 110 and 121). 
Defendant Robert knocked on that basement door and David Preece, 
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thinking it was his mother, unlocked it (R. 132). Defendant 
Robert shoved the door open, sending David back against the wall 
behind the door and hitting David with the door (R. 132). David 
saw defendant Robert run up the stairs and ran after him and saw 
the struggle between Pamela and defendant Robert (R. 132-33). 
Mrs. Preece saw that the basement door was open and ran 
to it and tried to close and block it (R. 110). One or both of 
the defendants still outside (James and Patrick) kicked the door, 
leaving marks and indentations in the new door (R. 110). The 
kicking jammed the lock so that Mrs. Preece was unable to secure 
the door (R. 110). The two defendants forced their way into the 
room and defendant James grabbed Mrs. Preece and knocked her to 
the floor (R. Ill and 123-24). Defendant James then kicked her 
and he and defendant Patrick grabbed her as she tried to crawl 
away (R. 111). She was screaming at them to leave the house and 
struggled toward the door of a downstairs bathroom (R. 111). She 
was able to open the door to the bathroom where her doberman was 
shut in (R. 111). Defendant James threatened to kill the dog as 
the dog came out then it cowered back in the bathroom (R. 111). 
At one point, as defendants James and Patrick came in 
the basement door, they grabbed fireplace tools including the 
stand, which were on the hearth near the door (R. 112). 
Defendant James still had the poker in his hand and he and 
defendant Patrick were still trying to hold Mrs. Preece as she 
made her way to the stairs leading to the upper floor (R. 112-
14). They both were hitting her as she approached the stairs (R. 
114-15). 
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As Mrs. Preece approached the stairs, defendant Robert 
came down them holding Pamela's youngest child (R. 115). 
Defendant Robert handed the child to defendant Patrick and Mrs. 
Preece was able to get away and start up the stairs (R. 115). As 
she started up the stairs, defendant James came after her and 
pushed her on to the landing and into the doors (R. 115). She 
then saw David with the gun at the top of the stairs telling 
defendants to get out (R. 115). During this time the hardwood 
banister and the steel front door sustained damage which, 
inferentially, occurred during the struggle (R. 116-17). 
David Preece had seen defendants arrive and locked the 
basement door (R. 131-32). After the door was forced open, David 
followed defendant Robert up the stairs and saw him struggle with 
Pamela (R. 132-33). David tried to get the two other children 
into another room so that they wouldn't be hurt and then helped 
Pamela dial the police (R. 133). He heard screaming and 
remembered the competition rifle in his mother's room (R. 133). 
He retrieved it and pointed it at defendant James who was holding 
a fireplace poker as if to spear Mrs. Preece in the entry way (R. 
133). When David pointed the gun and told defendants to leave, 
they did (R. 134). 
Two or three days after the occurrence, Pamela took 
photographs of the bruises sustained by Mrs. Preece and these 
were entered into evidence (R. 95-96 and Photos, State's Exhibit 
11). 
The defendants testified that they had never forced 
their way into the house and that they had never struck or pushed 
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Pamela Sandoval or LeAnn Preece (R. 166, 188 and 196)• 
Evidently, defendant James had called the police regarding his 
children being taken at approximately 11:15 a.m. on September 6, 
1987 (R. 139). He did not tell the police where the alleged 
abduction occurred or where the car with the children might be 
going (R. 139). An hour later in response to a second call by 
James, police went to Pamela's home to assist James in getting 
his children (R. 139-40). When the officer arrived the house was 
deserted and, as he was at the door, a call went out for officers 
to respond to the Preece residence on an assault in progress (R. 
14). Defendant James was unable to explain why he directed 
police to his ex-wife's house but never called them again when he 
went to the Preece residence (R. 118). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Burglary, in this case, must be proven by showing that 
defendants had both the general intent to unlawfully enter Mrs. 
Preece's residence and the specific intent to commit an assault. 
Such a specific intent need not exist at the time of entry 
because the elements of burglary include entering or remaining 
with an unlawful purpose. 
While unlawful entry alone may not support a burglary 
conviction, the trial court correctly inferred defendants' 
specific intent from the circumstances surrounding their entry 
into the Preece home. One defendant had threatened Pamela over 
the phone and the defendants forced their way into the house in a 
tumultuous fashion which obviously could cause injury. Two of 
the defendants, immediately upon entering the house, began to 
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kick and strike Mrs* Preece and the other raced upstairs and 
fought with Pamela. From the circumstances, the judge could and 
did reasonably infer an intent to assault on the part of 
defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGE'S FINDING, FROM THE FACTS AND 
REASONABLE INFERENCES, THAT DEFENDANTS 
INTENDED TO COMMIT ASSAULT IS SUPPORTED BY 
AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SURVIVE APPELLATE REVIEW. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently established the 
appellate standard of review for bench trials in State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). Since there is no rule of criminal 
procedure specifically dealing with that point, the Court cited 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988) and 
established the "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing a 
trial court's finding. The Court said: 
On January 1, 1987f however, new Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 52(a) took effect, 
providing: 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The language of Rule 52(a) is similar to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Federal case law has defined the standard of 
review in the federal rule and Wright & 
Miller summarizes that standard as follows: 
[I]t is not accurate to say 
that the appellate court takes 
that view of the evidence that is 
most favorable to the appellee, 
that it assumes that all conflicts 
in the evidence were resolved in 
his favor, and that he must be 
given the benefit of all favorable 
inferences. All of this is true 
in reviewing a jury verdict. It 
is not true when it is findings of 
the court that are being reviewed. 
Instead, the appellate court may 
examine all of the evidence in the 
record. It will presume that the 
trial court relied only on 
evidence properly admissible in 
making its finding in the absence 
of a clear showing to the 
contrary. It must give great 
weight to the findings made and 
the inferences drawn by the trial 
judge, but it must reject his 
findings if it considers them to 
be clearly erroneous. 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, S 2585 (1971) (citations omitted). 
The definition of Hclearly erroneous" in 
the federal rule comes from United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 
68 S. Ct. 525, 543 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948): 
A finding is -clearly 
erroneousH when although there is 
evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed. 
Further clarification is offered by Wright & 
Millers 
•11-
The appellate court . . . does 
not consider and weigh the 
evidence de novo. The mere fact 
that on the same evidence the 
appellate court might have reached 
a different result does not 
justify it in setting the findings 
aside* It may regard a finding as 
clearly erroneous only if the 
finding is without adequate 
evidentiary support or induced by 
an erroneous view of the law. 
Thus, the content of Rule 52(a)'s "clearly 
erroneous* standard, imported from the 
federal rule, requires that if the findings 
(or the trial court's verdict in a criminal 
case) are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made, the findings (or 
verdict) will be set aside. 
743 P.2d at 192-93. 
For this Court to overturn the trial court's finding of 
intent and verdict of guilt in this case, it must find that the 
trial court was clearly erroneous in its decision. This Court 
would have to rule that the verdict and finding were against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Such a ruling cannot be made in 
this case; the clear weight of the evidence does support the 
trial court's finding of intent and its verdict. 
The crime of burglary has two intent elements. The 
State must prove first that a defendant intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly entered or remained unlawfully in a building. See 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-102 (1978) (amended 1983) for culpable 
mental state requirement. Defendants do not dispute in their 
brief that they entered and remained unlawfully at the Preece 
residence. The evidence at trial also supports the finding of 
that element. 
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The specific intent element in this case was that the 
defendants entered the Preece residence with the intent to commit 
assault. Defendants' main contention is that their intent in 
going in the house was to retrieve the children so the trial 
court erred when it found that the defendants had the requisite 
specific intent to commit assault. The intent with which a 
person acts is rarely susceptible to direct proof and courts 
usually must determine intent based on circumstantial evidence. 
As the Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696 
(Utah 1968): 
It is true that the State was unable to prove 
directly what was in the defendant's mind 
relative to doing harm to the victim; and 
that he in fact denied having any such 
intent. However, his version does not 
establish the fact, nor does it ever 
necessarily raise sufficient doubt to vitiate 
the conviction. If it were so, it would lie 
within the power of a defendant to defeat 
practically any conviction which depended 
upon his state of mind. As against what he 
says, it is the jury's privilege to weigh and 
consider all of the other facts and 
circumstances shown in evidence in 
determining what they will believe. This 
includes not only what was said and what was 
done, but also the conduct shown, which in 
this instance they may well have regarded as 
speaking louder than the defendant's later 
defensive claims as to what his intentions 
were. This is in accord with the elementary 
rule that a person is presumed to intend the 
natural and probable consequences of his 
acts. 
453 P.2d at 697. 
The fact that defendants claim that they never struck 
anyone nor forced their way in nor intended to hurt anyone does 
not make the trial court's finding of intent "clearly erroneous." 
The court was able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and 
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determine that the testimony of the State's witness was more 
consistent and credible. A reading of the testimony of 
defendants displays inconsistencies between the stories told by 
each defendant and inconsistencies within each defendant's 
testimony. 
The Utah courts have consistently held that a requisite 
specific intent to support a burglary conviction may be inferred 
form the circumstances surrounding the entry. The Utah Supreme 
Court said in State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981): 
Since the intent to commit a theft is a 
state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of 
direct proof, it can be inferred from conduct 
and attendant circumstances in the light of 
human behavior and experience. 
631 P.2d at 881. 
More recently, in State v. Porterf 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a conviction in which the 
trial court had informed the jury that they could infer intent 
from all of the defendants' conduct at the scene on the date of 
the offense. The trial court had: 
clarified a point of law regarding how the 
jury may infer an actor's intent. 
We have defined an -inference" as: 
a logical and reasonable conclusion 
of the existence of a fact in the 
case, not presented by direct 
evidence as to the existence of the 
fact itself, but inferred from the 
establishment of other facts from 
which, by the process of logic and 
reason, based upon common 
experience, the existence of the 
assumed fact may be concluded by the 
trier of the fact. 
Wyatt v. Bauqhman, 121 Utah 98, 109, 239 P.2d 
193, 198-99 (1951). An inference goes to the 
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trier of fact to be weighed along with the 
contravening evidence because such inference, 
like all inferences capable of being drawn 
from evidence intrinsically containing the 
seeds from which logical deductions may be 
made, rests on basic facts which remain in 
the case. Id. at 110, 239 P.2d at 198-99 
[3] Burglarious intent "is a mental state 
of the actor. [T]he trier of fact must 
resort to reasonable inferences based upon 
[an] examination of the surrounding 
circumstances to reasonably infer its 
existence." Farno v. State, 159 Ind.App. 
627, 629, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725 (1974); see 
State v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856 (1981); 
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 
486 (1961); see also State v. Brooks, Utah, 
631 P.2d 878 (1981); State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 
2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (1958). Intent with 
which an entry is made is rarely susceptible 
of direct proof. It is usually inferred from 
circumstantial evidence: the manner of 
entry, the time of day, the character and 
contents of the building, the person's 
actions after entry, the totality of the 
surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's 
explanation. See 12A C.J.S., Burglary §§ 85 
and 104; 13 Am.Jur.2d, Burglary S 52. 
705 P.2d at 1177. See also State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 
(Utah 1981); State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985), 
and State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Utah 1986). 
In the present case, the trial court did infer the 
defendants' specific intent from their conduct. He found that 
defendants had forced their way into the Preece residence (R. 
230); that defendant James Sandoval had threatened Pamela over 
the phone before arriving at the house (R. 231); that there was a 
scuffle between defendant Robert Sandoval and Mrs. Preece and 
that she was pushed and shoved and was injured (R. 231); that 
there was a lot of scuffing and anger and running about the house 
(R. 231); that defendant James had threatened Mrs. Preece with 
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the fireplace poker (R. 232); and that the defendants has indeed 
inflicted injury on Mrs. Preece and Mrs. Sandoval (R. 232). (A 
copy of the trial court's findings as given in the transcript is 
attached in the Addendum.) These circumstances were well 
supported by both the State's and the defendants' evidence. The 
evidence also showed that the defendants had approached the house 
and its occupants in a tumultuous manner and forced their way in, 
knocking people away with the force of their entry. The trial 
court's inference of defendants' intent from this conduct is 
supported by the clear weight of the evidence and should not be 
disturbed. 
In their brief, defendants argued that their intent in 
entering the house was to retrieve the children so they couldn't 
have intended to assault anyone. They then argue that the court 
must have confused general with specific intent when it found 
that defendants intended to do whatever necessary to retrieve the 
children. Defendants misunderstand the court's finding. 
The court's decision that defendants intended "to take 
whatever steps were necessary, to inflict whatever injury was 
necessary to gain possession of those children " (R. 232) is not 
a finding solely of general intent. The court found that 
defendants intended to enter or remain unlawfully in the Preece 
residence (R. 230) then found that they intended whatever was 
necessary to accomplish their purposes. The manner of their 
entry and the injuries inflicted inside support the court's 
inference that defendants intended to assault, if necessary, to 
accomplish their ends. 
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Defendants also maintain that the specific intent to 
commit assault must exist at the time of entry. They cite State 
v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 (1929) in support of that 
theory. In 1929, the law read that, in order to commit a 
burglary, defendant must enter a building with the intent to 
commit a larceny. That is no longer the full law in Utah. Since 
1973, the law is that a burglary is committed when a person 
-enters or remains unlawfully in a building" and with the intent 
to commit a felony or theft or assault. A reading of the second 
case cited by defendants for their proposition confirms that the 
intent to commit a theft need not be formed at the time of entry 
into the building. In State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), 
the conviction for burglary was upheld. Defendant had lawfully 
entered a convenience store but, when he left the store, 
possessed a bank envelope which had been in a back office which 
was closed to the public. A day later he was stopped in a car 
which he had borrowed and not returned. The bank envelope and 
checks from the convenience store were found in his possession 
and other missing store checks were later rejected as forged by 
the bank. The Supreme Court said that there was sufficient 
evidence to affirm that defendant's burglary conviction. They 
held that "[e]ven an innocent entry into the office would not 
acquit defendant if he remained therein with the unlawful purpose 
of stealing the checks.H 728 P.2d at 116. The Court also said 
that unlawful entry into a private area alone may not support a 
finding of intent but, coupled with evidence of other surrounding 
circumstances, specific intent was properly inferred. 
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In the present case, the trial court correctly inferred 
from all of the surrounding circumstances that defendants entered 
or remained unlawfully in the Preece residence with the intent to 
commit assault. Before they entered, doors were locked against 
them but they forced their way in. After they entered, they were 
told to leave but they remained and assaulted the two women in 
the house. After they got one child they stayed solely to 
assault the women, from all appearances. Defendants appear to 
argue at the end of their brief that the assaults occurring after 
the defendants' entry could not support a finding of entry with 
intent to assault. They appear to argue that an assault must 
occur simultaneously with the entry in order to show intent but 
that notion is not supported by the statute nor case law. The 
State must only show that defendants intended to commit assault, 
not that an assault occurred. The fact that in this case actual 
physical striking occurred is merely another circumstance that 
affirms the trial court's inference that defendants had the 
requisite specific intent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and on oral arguments, if any, 
the State requests that this Court affirm the trial court's 
verdict. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^ day of November, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney, General . 
(J Uxv-\ e v^"il>^Jo^__ 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
It appears to the Court that it has been establish-
ed beyond any reasonable doubt: that the incident in this 
case occurred on the 6th of September 1987; that it did occur 
in Utah County; that the defendants did unlawfully enter or 
remain in the dwelling of Mrs. Preece. 
There is nothing in the record in any way to suggest] 
that they had any right to be in that buidling, in that 
dwelling, under the circumstances; even though they may have 
been interested in retrieving these children. And I think 
that's what their intent was, is to retrieve the children. 
They had no legal right, no business going upon the premises 
of Mrs. Preece under the circumstances and without her 
permission. 
It's obvious, it's on the record, even taking the 
evidence the most favorable to the position of the defen-
dants in any respect, that they did force their way into 
that building, into that dwelling, over the objection of 
Mrs. Preece and of Mrs. Sandoval and of David Preece. 
The question then resolves down to whether or not 
they had an intent to commit an assault as they entered upon 
that undertaking. 
I think the facts are established beyond a reason-
able doubt, that these men were intent upon regaining posses-
sion, irrespective of what it took and without any assistance,! 
that they were going to do it by self-help. 
i AQ 
1 The evidence appears to be clear and unrefuted 
2 that Pamela did call James after she got up to her mother's 
3 and told him that she had the children, they were there for 
4 visitation, and that James said "I'm coming to get youM; that 
5 Pamela felt threatened by that circumstance. 
6 The evidence is certainly clear that Robert went 
7 in the basement door of that dwelling, and in a contest with 
8 Mrs. Preece over the physical possession of the one minor 
9 child, the testimony of Mrs. Sandoval is that after they 
10 got into the building that she scuffled with Robert in an 
11 attempt to get her son away from Robert, the brother of the 
12 father of the child; that Robert hit her, on the head, that 
13 he stomped on her foot. 
14 The evidence is unrefuted and agreed upon that 
15 Robert and Mrs. Preece engaged in a scuffle over the posses-
16 sion of the child, and that that scuffle ensued from the 
17 outside into the building, and that Robert pursued the child 
18 and Mrs. Preece into the building. And the Court finds that 
19 there is no doubt, any reasonable doubt, about the fact that 
20 Mrs. Preece was pushed and shoved and that she did sustain 
21 injury. 
22 There is no dispute from anyone's part that there 
23 was a considerable amount of scuffling and running about in 
24 that place, there was a lot of anger exhibited. And the 
25 evidence, irrespective of whether or not the poker was 
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actually used by James, the evidence is clear that he was 
in a position standing over Mrs. Preece with the poker in 
a spear-position and only relinquished that position when 
David came upon the scene with the gun in his hand and 
ordered them out or that he would shoot. 
It appears to the Court, of course intent is a 
subjective thing, no one can look into one's mind and tell 
what is there. The only way we can arrive at that is by the 
actions that one undertakes. And it appears clear to the 
Court that there can be no doubt, no reasonable doubt, that 
these men had the intent to enter that building, that they 
had the intent to take whatever steps were necessary, to 
inflict whatever injury was necessary to gain possession of 
those children. They had the physical force, they had the 
ability, they had a show of force. There were three men 
against two women and a child. There isn't any question that 
these men, in the view of the Court, were acting intentional-
ly, that they were acting knowingly, the consequences of what 
they were doing; and that evidence of their intent to commit 
assault is further substantiated by the fact that they did in 
fact perpetrate and inflict injury upon Mrs. Preece and upon 
Mrs. Sandoval. 
So that the case that the Court has found and the 
Court believes that the perpetration of a battery necessarily 
implies intent. While "intent" may not--MattemptM may not 
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1 imply a battery or a completion of the act, the completion 
2 of the act certainly includes the attempt that the statute 
3 prohibits. 
4 So the Court, consequently, finds beyond a reason-
5 able doubt that these men, and eachof them, did have the 
6 intent when they entered that building to perpetrate an 
7 assault upon the occupants thereof. 
8 The Court believes that they are each responsible, 
9 under the circumstances, for the actions of the others, since 
10 it was a concerted effort on their part, they were aiding 
11 and abetting each other when they went into that building, 
12 and that, therefore, under the statute they are all three 
13 charged as principals. 
14 So the Court, consequently, finds each of you men 
15 guilty of the charge contained in Count I of the Information. 
16 With respect to Count II, that being the assault 
17 charge, it appears to the Court that since that is neces-
18 sarily an included offense with the Count I of burglary, 
19 the Court could not find them guilty of Count I without 
20 finding then that they are guilty of Count II, that being 
21 assault. I don't believe that the law would permit them to be 
22 punished or charge of convicted of that Count II. 
23 The Court refers in that respect to the case of 
24 State of Utah vs. Bradley, 19 Utah Advance Report 4, which 
makes reference to a case of State vs. Hill, 674 Pacific 2d 
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